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SOME "PROCEEDS" AND PRIORITY PROBLEMS UNDER
REVISED ARTICLE 9
RAY D. HENSON*
In one way the generality is not and cannot be news to anyone
that every day has its yesterday and every day has its tomorrow;
and yet, in another way, this can be a sort of news. There was the
first occasion on which this generality was presented to us, and
very surprising it was-despite the fact that on every day since in-
fancy we had thought about its particular yesterday and its par-
ticular tomorrow. There is, anyhow at the start, an important
sort of unfamiliarity about such generalizations of the totally
familiar.**
Prelimina'y Draft No. 2 of the Review Committee for Article 91
proposes a rather significant number of changes in the form of Article
9, although important practical changes in substance, as distinguished
from theory, are rather few in number. This general observation ap-
plies to the changes in section 9-306 dealing expressly with proceeds.
I
The least important change in Article 9 as a practical matter, but the
one which is bound to excite the most comment from some elements
of the bankruptcy bar, is the provision that makes the security interest
in proceeds automatic.2 As everyone with any practical experience
* B.S., University of Illinois, 1947; J.D., University of Illinois. 1949. Professor of Law,
Wayne State University Law School. The author is a member of the Review Com-
mittee for Article 9, whose work is discussed in this article, but these comments are
offered in a private capacity. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
William M. Moss, a second year student at Wayne State University Law School.
** RYL.E, DuLmdMAs 30 (1954).
1. This material has been published by and is available from the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. It also appeared in 25 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1970).
Preliminary Draft No. 2 is copyright 1970 by the American Law Institute, and quoted
portions are reproduced by permission of the American Law Institute. References to
sections in Preliminary Draft No. 2 will either be prefaced by "revised," or cited as
"Revised Code." References to the 1962 Uniform Connnercial Code will either be
cited as "1962 Code" or simply be referred to without identification. A number of
changes have been made in Preliminary Draft No. 2, resulting in the Final Report sub-
mitted to the American Law Institute on May 20, 1971, but the changes are not sub-
stantial in the context of this article.
2. The security interest in proceeds has always been automatic for ten days after
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knows, security agreements routinely provide for a security interest in
proceeds even though it is highly unlikely that the collateral will be sold
and even though it would be a default if it were. Financing statements
contain boxes to check if a security interest in proceeds is intended and,
aside from inadvertent clerical omissions, this box is always checked
unless the form comes with a printed check in the box. Proceeds are
always claimed, absent error, in accounts and inventory financing, and
all third parties are aware of this, both as a practical matter and con-
structively or actually because of filed financing statements. In other
words, the revised Code is simply recognizing as a matter of law what
everyone recognizes as a fact of life.
This provision in no sense creates a statutory lien within the Bank-
ruptcy Act.' Statutory liens arise apart from contract.4 In this case
receipt of the proceeds following a disposition of the collateral by the debtor. The
requirement of a filed financing statement covering proceeds applied only beyond the
ten-day period. See 1962 Code §§ 9-306(2), (3). With modifications, this requirement
is continued in revised section 9-306(3). Section 9-203(1), which specified that a
security interest was not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless the
debtor had signed a security agreement describing the collateral, had a sentence stating
that the word "proceeds" was sufficient to cover proceeds of any "character." This
presumably could only have applied to the period following ten days after the receipt
of the proceeds. While it has usually been assumed that section 9-203 (1) (b) required
a reference to proceeds in the security agreement if proceeds were to be claimed, if
'this provision is read carefully, the assumption may be debatable. In no event is such a
reference necessary under revised section 9-203(3). The confusion resulting from the
relationship between "agreement" as used in sections 9-203 (1) and 9-204(1) has led to a
consolidation of these provisions in revised section 9-203(1) so that it is now unmistak-
ably clear that the agreement necessary for attachment is a written security agreement,
except for pledges. The form of the financing statement specified in section 9-402(3)
has been changed in several respects, and revised section 9-402(3) eliminates any
reference to proceeds. The revision of § 9-203 (3) approved by the Review Committee
was changed by the Permanent Editorial Board and the provision now reads: "Unless
otherwise agreed a security agreement gives the secured party the rights to proceeds
provided by Section 9-306." This emphasizes the consensual element in the security.
The change was approved by the American Law Institute on May 20, 1971.
3. The Bankruptcy Act's definition of "statutory lien" says that it is "a lien arising
solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not
include any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether
or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether or
not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by statute." Bankruptcy Act, § 1 (29a),
11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1964) (emphasis added). While this definition seems clearly on
its face not to apply to the 1962 or revised proceeds provisions, a suggestion that the
revised Code does create a statutory lien is contained in Countryman, Code Security
Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 Comv. L. J. 269, 272 (1970).
4. See generally V. CoUNTRYMN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR
458-70 (1964); Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MIm. L. Rav. 697 (1955).
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the statute recognizes and states that if the parties by contract create
a security interest in designated collateral, that security interest extends
to the identifiable proceeds of the collateral if it is disposed of.5 This is
simply a specific statutory recognition of pre-Code common law6 and
statutory law.7 The Code provision is in accord with the understanding
that everyone has in these cases: if third parties have no claim to the
collateral, they know they have no claim to its proceeds. Absent bank-
ruptcy and the hope of a windfall, third party, non-reliance creditors
are perfectly aware of this.
II
The revised Code eliminates apparent inconsistencies in the 1962 Code
between or among section 9-203 (1) (b) which appears to require a claim
to proceeds in the security agreement for the interest to be good against
the debtor, section 9-402(3) which appears to require a claim on the
financing statement for the interest to be good against the third parties,
and section 9-306(2) which provides for an automatic continuance of
the interest into identifiable proceeds when the collateral is disposed of.
Surely no one has ever questioned the right of a secured party to claim
the proceeds of collateral wrongfully disposed of, as against non-reliance
creditors; and in the case of inventory or accounts financing the secured
party's right to proceeds as such has never been questioned, only the
means by which that right is recognized and enforced. To say that a
secured party never has any right to proceeds arising on the disposition
of any collateral would be going a bit far, even for some bankruptcy
specialists, although that might be a logical conclusion to some of their
premises.
Since the term "proceeds" includes whatever is received when col-
lateral is disposed of, it has always been theoretically possible to claim
a security interest in a Chagall acquired with the proceeds arising from
the wrongful sale of a dealer's financed stock of automobiles. No such
far-fetched example appears to have arisen outside the classroom. This
will not be possible under the revised Code where the security interest
in the proceeds must have been capable of perfection by a filing in the
5. 1962 Code §§ 9-306(2), (3); Revised Code §§ 9-306(2), (3).
6. See, e.g., Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. McCallum, 58 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 619 (1932); In re James, Inc, 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
7. See, e.g., Taylor v. Quittner, 218 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1954); Commerce Union




same office where the original financing statement was filed.' Of course,
if an important instance of this kind should arise, it is theoretically still
possible for the secured party to learn of the disposition and file an
appropriate financing statement concerning the proceeds within ten days
after their receipt.9 A further refinement is that if the proceeds are ac-
quired with cash proceeds, as they almost certainly will be in a com-
mercial context, the description of the collateral on the financing state-
ment must indicate the types of property constituting the proceeds.10
If a bank is financing a merchant's "inventory," either in general or of a
specific, described kind, this clearly accords with the intent of the parties.
Should a merchant sell his financed inventory and purchase a Renoir,
there are other ways of reaching it if an innocent third party purchaser
has not already acquired it by the time the secured party wakes up.
There is no restriction, nor has there been, on tracing the security
interest into identifiable proceeds within ten days after their receipt by
the debtor, but the special problem dealt with arises beyond that time.
The revised Code does not purport to continue the security interest in
all conceivable proceeds merely because a filed financing statement makes
a claim to proceeds in general. It will no longer be possible to claim a
proceeds security interest in instruments alone (other than checks) be-
yond ten days after their receipt because they are not "cash proceeds"
and it is not possible to perfect an interest in instruments as such by
filing." Possession can be taken, of course. If the proceeds are chattel
paper (of which the secured party does not take possession) or acounts,
8. Revised Code S 9-306(3) (a). A dealer's stock of automobiles would be "inventory"
under section 9-109. While most theoretical examples of the type in the text assume
that the expensive painting bought with the proceeds of inventory would be "con-
sumer goods," it is not impossible that such a painting would turn out arguably to
be "equipment" in an era when many businesses of various kinds indulge in art dis-
plays, perhaps to improve the public image of the business or perhaps to gratify a
whim of a principal in the business. If the painting turned out to be equipment, the
security interest would be perfected by a filing in the same office in which the inven-
tory financing statement was filed. In any case the security interest in the painting as
identifiable proceeds would be good for ten days if the painting were traded for cars,
which is unlikely, and if the painting was acquired with cash proceeds then the col-
lateral described in the financing statement must have indicated this type of property,
or else the security interest in the painting as proceeds must have been perfected before
the end of the ten-day period after the cash proceeds were received. See Revised Code
§ 9-306(a), (c). Neither situation is likely to occur.
9. Revised Code § 9-306(3) (c); 1962 Code § 9-306(3) (b).
10. Revised Code § 9-306(3) (c). See note 8 supra.
11. 1962 Code § 9-304(1). But note the specific recognition of a "proceeds" interest
in instruments under revised section 9-304(1), which specifically includes sections
9-306(2), (3).
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a filing will be required in the appropriate jurisdiction,12 rather than
being automatically perfected by a claim to proceeds in the original
financing statement.'" This eliminates the potentially troublesome prob-
lem under the 1962 Code where a sale by a branch store located in
Indiana might have given an Indiana inventory secured party a perfected
security interest in an account recorded in Chicago in the debtor's head
office. The interplay between sections 9-306(3) and 9-103 (1) was not
clear here.
It must be emphasized that the changes in Article 9 affecting proceeds
are not, as a practical matter, significant. Both the 1962 Code and the
revised Code provide for a security interest to continue in "identifiable
proceeds including collections received by the debtor." 14 The 1962
Code gave a continuing security interest beyond the ten-day period
when the filed financing statement expressly covered proceeds or when
there was an appropriate filing within that period.'5 The revised ver-
sion continues the possibility of perfecting a security interest in any
kind of proceeds within the ten-day period but eliminates the continua-
tion into proceeds of any kind because of an original filing as to col-
lateral and proceeds in favor of restricting the continuing automatic
interest in two ways: one, the interest continues in identifiable cash
proceeds of the original collateral where there is a filed financing state-
ment, which as a practical matter is not likely to be an important situa-
tion because identifiable cash proceeds are not likely to remain on hand
very long;' 6 and, two, where the proceeds are collateral in which the
security interest could have been perfected by filing in the the same
office where the original financing statement was filed, which is rather
limited to trade-in cases, or if the proceeds are acquired with cash pro-
ceeds the originally described collateral must also indicate the types
of collateral which the proceeds constitute. 17 This permits financing
inventory or accounts on a continuing basis.
The new "proviso" to section 9-306(3) is quite significant for it states
that except as otherwise provided, "a security interest in proceeds can
12. Ccrnpare Revised Code § 9-103(6) with 1962 Code § 9-103(1). There is no
specific conflict of laws rule covering chattel paper in section 9-103. In the Final Report
of the Review Committee approved by the American Law Institute on May 20, 1971,
Revised Code § 9-103 was extensively rearranged for clarity.
13. Compare 1962 Code § 306(3) (a) witb Revised Code § 9-306(3) (a).
14. 1962 Code § 9-306(2); Revised Code§ 9-306(2).
15. 1962 Code § 9-306 (3).
16. Revised Code § 9-306(3) (b).
17. Id. § 9-306(3) (a).
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be perfected only by the methods or under the circumstances permitted
... for original collateral of the same type." Note that the provision
refers to "type," not "item or type." A reference to "item or type"
appears both in the 1962 Code in section 9-312 (3) (c) and in the revised
Code in section 9-312 (3) (d) in connection with inventory financing
priorities, and the reference to "item" will normally be meaningless
since inventory will usually be described simply by type, but within the
provisions of section 9-306 "type" is clearly broader than "item." Be
that as it may, it will be necessary for the secured party to take posses-
sion of instruments if the security interest in them is to continue beyond
the ten-day period, and if trade-ins are not likely to be of the same type
as the original collateral, policing will be of even more value than
would often be the case.
Without serious question, the proceeds provisions of the Code are of
routine, primary importance only in accounts or inventory financing.
(These provisions are also of importance when a debtor is dishonest
or when any collateral is destroyed and insurance proceeds are payable,
but these are exceptional situations.) It is vital that this kind of financing
be given a firm base for operation, and the Code is designed for this
purpose.
The revised Code may make a change in a problem arising from a
typical consumer transaction. Under the 1962 Code, if, for example,
a consumer buys a refrigerator on time and no financing statement is
filed, the seller (and his assignee) may have a perfected purchase money
security interest in the refrigerator and, if it is sold, in its proceeds, but
that interest would not extend beyond ten days and into a new refrigera-
tor bought with the proceeds arising from the sale of the old one, unless
a financing statement claiming proceeds had been filed.' If a financing
statement has been filed and the refrigerator is traded in on a new one
which is sold on a conditional sale contract, in the event of default the
resolution of the priority conflict-admittedly a minor one-is not clear.
18. See 1962 Code §§ 9-302(1), 9-306(3); Revised Code §§ 9-302(1)(d), 9-306(3).
Both the 1962 Code and the revised version require a filed financing statement to claim
proceeds of collateral beyond ten days after their receipt. The only difference in this
case is that the financing statement under the revised version need not state that pro-
ceeds are covered; in both versions a security interest in proceeds can be perfected by
a filing within the ten-day period, and only the secured party need sign the financing
statement. 1962 Code § 9-402(2) (b); Revised Code § 9-402 (2) (b). -No financing state-
ment is required to perfect a purchase money security interest in most consumer goods,
but in the absence of filing certain purchasers will take free of the security interest.
1962 Code §§ 9-302(1) (d), 9-307(2); Revised Code §§ 9-302(1) (d), 9-307(2).
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It is obvious that the new conditional seller has a purchase money se-
curity interest, but it is not clear whether the first seller also has such
an interest in the second refrigerator.
The Code has never explicitly resolved the priority between a condi-
tional seller and a purchase money financer who provides the balance
of the purchase price of consumer goods, at least if neither interest is
filed. It has been generally thought that these financers ranked equally,
in proportion to their financial interests, since neither was entitled to
priority.
The revised Code now provides that a purchase money security
interest, in collateral other than inventory, has priority over a con-
flicting security interest in that collateral or its proceeds, if the purchase
money security interest is perfected when the debtor gets possession of
the collateral, as is true in the case of purchase money security interests
in consumer goods, or within ten days thereafter. 19 It is not obvious
how or whether this provision applies to our problem. The first seller,
who filed, has a purchase money security interest and it carries through
into the proceeds and is entitled to priority over "a conflicting security
interest." But the second security interest is also a purchase money
security interest in our example. If this case is not resolved by section
9-312(4), and probably it is not, then priority is determined by "pri-
ority in time of filing or perfection" 20 and "a date of filing .. .as to
collateral is also a date of filing ... as to proceeds," 21 which appears to
give priority to the first financer. There may be nothing wrong with
this result as a practical matter, but it is arguably a change from the
1962 Code. If this result can be reached in the case of consumer goods,
it can also be reached in appropriate cases involving equipment. In other
words, the revised Code seems to enact a priority for collateral other
than inventory, in purchase money situations, which could have been
implied from the 1962 Code, although some would not have done so and
vehemently would not have done so in the case of inventory.
Some changes have been made in section 9-306(4) which restrict the
secured party's interest in proceeds in the event of insolvency. The
changes are technical rather than substantive. The enforceability of sec-
tion 9-306(4) under the 1962 Code has not been open to serious ques-
tion.22
19. Revised Code § 9-312 (4).
20. Id. § 9-312 (5) (a).
21. Id. § 9-312(6).




It is a rare security agreement that does not require the debtor to
carry casualty insurance when the collateral is goods; the omission is
almost certain to be a mistake, for a lender looks to insurance proceeds
as a substitute for the collateral if the goods are destroyed. Anyone who
has ever bought a home subject to a mortgage is well aware of this.
Everyone knows of the common understanding except the few courts
which have been confronted by cases involving proceeds of casualty
insurance payable by reason of damage to or destruction of the col-
lateral.23
While it should have been clear that insurance proceeds were pro-
ceeds of collateral, this was not plainly spelled out by section 9-306(1)
of the 1962 Code and the application of section 9-306(2) was even less
clear. These provisions have now been revised to make clear what
ought to have been clear in the first place. A sentence has been added
in revised section 9-306(1) stating: "Insurance payable by reason of
loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is
payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement."
While a secured party will normally stipulate that casualty insurance be
carried, he may inadvertently fail to be certain that he is named loss
payee, and if a second secured party is named loss payee on the policy,
whatever is received by that party will not be proceeds available to the
first secured party. This is true, without regard to what the Code says,
as a matter of insurance law. If the proceeds are payable to the debtor,
then they clearly are subject to the security interest in the original col-
lateral,24 even though the secured party was not named loss payee.
Pa. 1962); In re Morris, 8 UCC REP. SEmv. 593 (WD. Okla. 1970) (in bankruptcy);
In re JCM Cooperative, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SEmV. 247 (WD. Mich. 1970) (in bankruptcy);
In re Gibson, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1193 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (in bankruptcy); In re C. E.
Pontz & Son, Inc. 2 UCC REP. SEv. 1120 (E.D. Pa.) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 7 UCC
REP. SEv. 1131 (ED. Pa. 1965); Farnum v. C. J. Merrill, Inc., 264 A.2d 150 (Me. 1970);
Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. (No. 3), 25 Pa. D. & C.2d
395, 1 UCC REP. SERV. 531 (C.P., Phil. County 1958) (involving the predecessor of the
present section 9-306 (4) (d)).
23. Most of the cases are discussed in Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" Under
Article 9, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. Rtv. 453 (1969).
24. That is, insurance proceeds are "received" when the collateral is "disposed of."
1962 Code § 9-306(1), (2). Insurance proceeds will ordinarily materialize in the form
of a draft in which a security interest can be perfected only by possession, under
section 9-304(1), except in the case of proceeds, and a claim to proceeds in a financing
statement is necessary to continue the security interest in the proceeds beyond ten days
after their receipt unless possession is taken (1962 Code § 9-306(3)). It will become
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IV
D Department Store finances its inventory with S Bank. The security
agreement dated January 4, 1971, gives S a security interest in traded-in
goods, conditional sale contracts, cash, and any other "proceeds" re-
ceived on the sale of new inventory. An appropriate financing state-
ment is filed. A loan of $1,000,000 is made. On February 1, R Re-
frigerator Co. enters into an arrangement with D to supply refrigera-
tors on a purchase money basis for sale by D, a financing statement is
filed, and R sends a notice to S that this kind of purchase money
financing is going to be engaged in with respect to R refrigerators before
any refrigerators are supplied. In addition to R refrigerators, D also
sells, X, Y, and Z brands of refrigerators.
In a surprising flurry of activity, D sold its entire inventory of re-
frigerators immediately prior to getting into financial difficulty on June
30, 1971. On this date, D had on hand a number of checks representing
refrigerators sold for cash, checks representing down-payments on re-
frigerators sold on conditional sale along with the conditional sale
contracts, some traded-in refrigerators, cash representing down-pay-
ments deposited in a special "refrigerator" account, and cash com-
mingled in other deposit accounts and not specifically identified.
Assuming that the priority competition is solely between S and R,
who wins?
A perfected purchase money security interest in the refrigerators,
which R's interest would be, has priority over the bank's interest under
revised section 9-312(3) because there was an appropriate filing and S
Bank was duly notified in writing before the inventory was supplied, but
this priority extends only to the refrigerators supplied by R and to
identifiable cash proceeds received on or before delivery of the inven-
tory to a buyer.
Revised section 9-306 (2) continues the earlier provision that a security
interest continues in identifiable proceeds-it cannot continue in inven-
tory after sale.25 Revised section 9-306(3) provides that this interest
continues even beyond ten days after the debtor receives the proceeds
imperative for the secured party to be named loss payee as a practical matter under
revised section 9-306(3). Otherwise (1) the secured party must get physical possession
of the draft within ten days after the debtor receives it, or (2) the draft must be
retained as such or deposited in a special account, or (3) the draft must be transformed
into the same type of property as the original collateral within the ten-day period.
See Revised Code § 9-306(3).
25. 1962 Code § 9-307(1); Revised Code § 9-307 (1).
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if a security interest in the proceeds could have been perfected by a
filing in the office where the origial financing statement was filed, and,
although not applicable here, the description of the original collateral
indicates the type of property constituting proceeds where it is ac-
quired with cash proceeds.
As to priority, the new rules do not give the purchase money in-
ventory financer (R) priority in the traded-in refrigerators. This
priority conflict between R and S is determined in the order of filing
under revised section 9-312 (5) (a) because R's purchase money security
interest is not covered in this aspect by revised section 9-312(3), and
consequently the first inventory financer to file-here, S-has priority.
R would have priority over S as to checks on hand representing pro-
ceeds of cash sales of R's refrigerators or down payments on them, and
in traceable cash in the "refrigerator" account, assuming that these
"cash" proceeds are identifiable.2 R would be subordinate to S as to
conditional sale contracts, even those involving R's refrigerators,2 7 and,
assuming insolvency, it would also be subordinate as to commingled
funds in deposit accounts.28 R's security interest would continue to be
perfected in these accounts on insolvency, but R is not entitled to
priority over S.
V
S Bank takes a security interest in the accounts arising from the sale
of D Store's inventory. Subsequently T Bank agrees to finance D's
inventory and its proceeds. The proceeds may include cash, accounts,
traded-in goods, and chattel paper.
Under the 1962 Code there was an academic disagreement about
26. Revised Code § 9-312(3): "A perfected purchase money security interest in
inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and in
identifiable cash proceeds received on or before delivery of the inventory to a
buyer . . . " "Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like are 'cash proceeds.'"
Revised Code § 9-306(1).
27. The conditional sale contracts would not be "cash proceeds." See note 26 supra.
Not coming under the special priority rule of revised section 9-312(3), priority is
determined by revised section 9-312(5) (a), and revised section 9-312(6) provides:
"For the purposes of subsection (5) a date of filing or perfection as to collateral is
also a date of filing or perfection as to proceeds." See also Revised Code § 9-306(2), (3).
28. See Revised Code § 9-306(4) (d) stating a rule of perfection in insolvency. The
applicable priority rule is revised section 9-312(5) (a). "Deposit account" is a new
term, and in revised section 9-105(e) it is defined to mean "a checking, savings, pass-
book or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association, credit union
or like organization."
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whether S or T had priority in the accounts generated from the sale
of inventory after T entered the picture.29 Under the revised Code,
the intention is that S should have priority as to the accounts even
though they arise from inventory financed by T.,° (This makes it more
advisable than ever that T police the proceeds arising on the sale of
financed inventory.) Since there is no means by which purchase money
financing of accounts arising from retail sales can be accomplished, the
special rules on purchase money priorities of revised section 9-312(3)
and (4) are inapplicable, and these conflicts are resolved by revised
section 9-312(5) which gives priority to the first to file as to the col-
lateral in which the conflict arises, or the accounts here. (Had the
inventory and accounts financer filed ahead of the accounts financer
here, the first to file would have priority in the accounts, since the date
of filing as to collateral is also the date of filing as to proceeds.)3 ' T
would have priority vis-a-vis S as to the other identifiable proceeds. 32
VI
D Department Store sells a refrigerator to C, a consumer, on condi-
tional sale in State Y. No financing statement is filed. Two months
later C moves to State X, and no financing statement is filed in X. Then
C grants a security interest in the goods to J, and a financing statement
is filed. Seven months later C defaults in payments under the condi-
tional sale contract. Can D enforce its security interest in State X as
against I?
The 1962 Code was less than explicit on this problem; alternatively,
it did not cover this problem at all. The apparently applicable sentence
in section 9-103 (3) said:
If the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest
29. Compare Henson, Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE
DAME LA w. 425, 431-32 (1966), with Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9:
Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 726 (1966), and Henson,
Countersuggestions Regarding Article 9: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 42 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 74, 75-77 (1967). See generally Moye, Priorities of Inventory and Accounts
Financers Under Article 9 of the Uniform Cotmercial Code, 23 Bus. LAw. 1013 (1968).
30. See REVIEv COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
PREULIINARY DRAFT No. 2, 29-32 (1970) in 25 Bus. LAw. 1067, 1092-94 (E33-E38) (1970).
31. Revised Code § 9-312(6).
32. If S is financing only accounts, presumably S could not claim a security interest-
only T could-in the other proceeds arising on the sale of inventory.
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attached and before being brought into this state, the security
interest continues perfected in this state for four months and also
thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected in this
state.
This sentence suggests that affirmative action is required to perfect
D's security interest in State X, although section 9-302 (1) (d) requires
no affirmative action at any time for a purchase money financer to per-
fect a security interest in consumer goods.8 It could reasonably be
argued, of course, that the purchase money security interest was indeed
perfected in the second state since there was never a time when it was
unperfected in either state, and this would be the clearly correct result.
It is made indisputably certain in Revised Article 9.34 Perhaps some of
the difficulty with the conflict of laws rules in the 1962 Code (and
earlier versions) arose because of the uncertainty about the adoption of
the Code throughout the states. This is no longer a problem. The rules
can now be stated with all-encompassing language, and earlier am-
biguities can be removed in favor of clearer, more definite language. In
this area, as in others, experience has value.
VII
While it was clear under section 9-306 (1) that checks were proceeds
and that a proceeds security interest in them could be perfected by
filing, section 9-304(1) provided that a security interest in instruments
(other than instruments which were part of chattel paper) could be
perfected only by taking possession of them, aside from specific ex-
ceptions for temporary perfection. This conflict is resolved in revised
section 9-304(1) which excepts instruments from the possessory re-
quirement when they are proceeds and recognizes that a security interest
in them can be perfected by filing when they are claimed as proceeds.
By definition, the term "instrument" includes a negotiable instrument,
a security, and any other writing evidencing a right to the payment of
money (other than a security agreement or lease) if it is of a type
33. Filing is required for a fixture or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed.
1962 Code § 9-302 (1) (d). This provision has been revised to make the exceptions: "for
a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is required for priority
over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9-313." Revised
Code § 9-302(1) d) (emphasis added). But in the absence of filing, a consumer buyer
from a consumer seller can take free of such a perfected purchase money security
interest if the requirements of section 9-307(2) are met.
34. Revised Code § 9-103 (3).
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which is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or as-
signment in the ordinary course of business.85
Section 9-308 has always had an enigmatic aspect. The first sentence
reads:
A purchaser of chattel paper or a non-negotiable instrument
who gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary
course of his business and without knoweldge that the specific
paper or instrument is subject to a security interest has priority
over a security interest which is perfected under Section 9-304
(permissive filing and temporary perfection).
While "permissive filing" is applicable to chattel paper, the "tempo-
rary perfection" provisions of section 9-304 are not. While the provi-
sions of section 9-304 are, in terms, applicable to non-negotiable instru-
ments, since the word "instrument" is used, in the context of the section
probably only negotiable instruments or securities are intended to be
covered.38 Revised section 9-308 in the first sentence drops "non-nego-
tiable" and now covers purchasers of chattel paper and instruments.
The second sentence of section 9-308 gives priority to a purchaser
of chattel paper (who gives new value and takes possession of the
paper in the ordinary course of business) over a security interest claimed
merely as proceeds of financed inventory, even though the purchaser
knows of the inventory financer's security interest. One effect of this
is to allow the purchaser to take a negotiable instrument free of prior
claims if he buys it as part of chattel paper, when he could not have
taken a negotiable instrument alone free of the inventory financer's
claim under section 9-309 for he could not have been a holder in due
35. 1962 Code § 9-105 (g); Revised Code § 9-105 (i).
36. Comment 4 to 1962 Code § 9-304 states: "Subsections (4) and (5) follow the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act in giving perfected status to security interests in instru-
ments and documents . . "' in specified instances. Section 8 of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, which is probably the target of the reference, applied to goods, docu-
ments and instruments, but "instrument" was defined to include (a) negotiable in-
struments as defined in the NIL, (b) stock certificates, bonds, and debentures, and (c)
certain kinds of interim, deposit, or participation certificates, etc. Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act, § 1. Some instruments, such as registered obligations which would not
have been negotiable under the NIL are made negotiable under section 8-105(l), and
were apparently covered by the definition of "instrument" in section 1 of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. But the third class of obligations covered by section 9-105(g) and




course because of his knowledge of the earlier interest.87 The second
sentence of revised section 9-308 reads:
A purchaser of chattel paper or an instrument who gives new
value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness has priority over a security interest therein [in chattel paper]
which is claimed merely as proceeds of prior collateral [inventory
subject to a security interest] (Section 9-306), even though he
knows that the specific chattel paper or instrument is subject to
the security interest.
While the revision undoubtedly removes an anomaly, the use of the
word "instrument" may create problems in time. Since the term
"purchaser" includes the holder of a security interest,38 some accounts
financers may be benefited by extending the benefits of the purchaser
beyond chattel paper claimed merely as proceeds of inventory to chat-
tel paper and instruments claimed merely as proceeds of "prior col-
lateral." The ramifications of the changes have not yet crystallized.
VIII
The elimination of the term "contract right" 0 should produce some
interesting problems. In the 1962 Code a contract right is "any right
to payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and not
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." 40 Because the 1962
Code's definition of "account" is narrower than the ordinary usage
of "account receivable," there apparently were instances where secured
parties mistakenly claimed an interest in contract rights and accounts
(rather than merely proceeds) when the claim should have been to
general intangibles rather than accounts. Many contract rights would
not turn into accounts on performance of the contract because account
is defined in the 1962 Code as "any right to payment for goods sold
or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instru-
ment or chattel paper." 4' To this definition the revised Code will add:
"whether or not it has been earned by performance."
Insofar as the security interest arises out of a contract relating to
goods or services, the elimination of "contract right" is advantageous.
37. 1962 Code § 3-302(1) (c); Final Report § 9-103(1) (d).
38. Id. § 1-201 (31), (32).
39. Revised Code § 9-106.
40. 1962 Code § 9-106.
41. Id.
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As redefined, "account" will cover the right to payment before and
when it is earned.
Potential problems may come to light when the unearned rights to
payment relate to things other than goods or services. An agreement
under which a patent is licensed with payments to be earned in the
future will present some difficulty under the definition of general in-
tangibles which, as revised, says that the term means "any personal
property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chat-
tel paper, documents, instruments, and money." 42 For anyone who
finds the term "things in action" devoid of meaning and who cannot
readily associate the term "personal property" with a right to payment
which has not been earned and which may never be earned-that is,
when we speak of personal property we normally think of something
which has a present existence-it will be challenging to call this collateral
a general intangible prior to the time it is earned. 43
In contests between sureties and financing banks arising out of con-
struction contracts, the revised definitions would, at least superficially,
seem to reinforce the surety's reliance on common law subrogation
rights rather than filing.4 In fact, whether the bank should file, and
42. Revised Code § 9-106.
43. Since Article 9 applies, subject to specific exceptions, "to any transaction (re-
gardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property"
(1962 Code § 9-102(1) (a)), any such transaction has to fit somewhere. It was con-
ceptually simpler to fit appropriate unearned contractual rights to payment into "con-
tract right" than it will be to say that some of these rights are general intangibles as
that term is defined.
44. In general, the practice apparently has been for banks to file financing state-
ments when they were financing construction contracts, while sureties did not file
but relied on subrogation rights. In most cases sureties have been wise to do so.
Compare United States v. G. P. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723 (WD. Pa. 1958)
,with Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965) and National
Shawmut Bank of Boston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) and
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Perrotta, 62 Misc. 2d 252, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
But see Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mullett, 295 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1969); National Sur.
Corp. v. State Nat'l Bank of Frankfort, 454 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1970). It was questionable
whether a surety had a "right to payment under a contract not yet earned by per-
formance," as section 9-106 requires for a contract right. (Emphasis added). If there
was such a contract right, then it was arguably excluded from Article 9 as "a transfer
of a contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the con-
tract." 1962 Code § 9-104(f). Yet the conflict was just not the kind that Article 9 was
designed to cover. Presumably no one will argue that a surety's right to payment, in the
event of performance, arises from a contract for goods sold or leased or services
rendered, as an account must. Nor can a surety's rights be easily fit into the definition
of general intangibles. In a definitive opinion written by Mr. Justice (formerly Profes-
REVISED ARTICLE 9
if so as to what, is less than mmediately obvious. 5
sor) Braucher, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has now held that "[Fliling
under the Code is unnecessary to preserve the priority of a surety's rght of subrogation
over the rights of a construction contractor's trustee in bankruptcy. " Canter v.
Schlager, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 932, 935 (Mass. 1971).
45. Or, as Sir Walter Scott put it, 'We build statues of snow and weep when they
melt." Quoted m Auden, Book Review, THE NEw Youata, Feb. 20, 1971, at 117
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